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Death Penalty and Mental Illness:                       
The Challenge of Reconciling Human Rights, 
Criminal Law, and Psychiatric Standards  
 Liliana Lyra Jubilut1 
I remind myself that many of the mistakes in mental health care 
come from a helping attitude. But they want to help without 
asking you, without understanding you, without involving you, 
“in your best interest.”2  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, gains made under international human rights law have 
resulted in an expanding realm of people protected by its norms.  Early 
efforts focused on the assurance of individual rights and evolved to 
encompass “traditional and visible minorities”; more recently, efforts are 
focused on addressing concerns about “invisible, underprotected 
minorities,” including people with disabilities in general and people who 
suffer from mental disorders3—especially mental disabilities and mental 
illness4—in particular.5  Focus on this last group is due to the fact that 
“[f]rom a human rights perspective, the intellectually disabled rank among 
the world’s most vulnerable and at-risk populations, both because they are 
different and because their disability renders them less able either to assert 
their rights or to protect themselves against blatant discrimination.”6  
The focus of the protection has been to establish that people who suffer 
from mental disorders, being “different but equal”7 in dignity and rights, are 
entitled to all human rights “simply because of their humanity.”8  Thus far, 
most of the battles have been attempts to ensure that the people who suffer 
from mental disorders have equal opportunities and are protected while in 
treatment and confinement.9  Recently, the scope of protection sought has 
expanded to include an attempt to carve out an exemption from the death 
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penalty for people who suffer from mental disorders.  This article examines 
those efforts in the United States through the lens of international human 
rights law.  
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia10 
exempted people who suffer from mental retardation from the death 
penalty.  Following this decision, Amnesty International (AI)11 and the 
American Bar Association (ABA)12 began independent efforts to advocate 
for the extension of this exemption to people who suffer from mental 
illness.13  These initiatives are valuable because they bring to light an 
important topic and initiate debate on the issue.  Unfortunately, however, 
both proposals fall short of advocating for comprehensive protection for the 
human dignity of people who suffer from mental illness14 in legal systems 
that retain capital punishment.  In this article, the limitations of the ABA 
and AI proposals will be addressed so as to highlight the main problems that 
arise in attemtping to provide the most effective protection from the death 
penalty to people who suffer from mental illness. 
The proposals are inadequate in two ways.  First, because the issue of 
mental health and the death penalty involves the convergence of medicine 
and law, providing protection from capital punishment to people who suffer 
from mental illness will only be feasible through an interdisciplinary 
approach that encompasses human rights, criminal law, and psychiatry.  In 
both the AI and ABA proposals, such collaboration exists only 
superficially. 
Second, in addressing the issue of capital punishment and mental illness, 
one can emphasize one of two approaches: abolishing the death penalty 
altogether or protecting the people who suffer from mental illness while 
maintaining the dealth penalty in general.  The resulting proposals depend 
on which approach is chosen.  Both the ABA and the AI proposals focus on 
an abolitionist position, with the protection of people who suffer from 
mental illness playing a supporting role.  Although this focus is consistent 
with both organizations’ goals to limit the scope of the use of capital 
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punishment,15 this article argues that in relation to the death penalty and 
mental illness in the United States, the proposals are ultimately too limited 
to effectively exempt people who suffer from mental illness from capital 
punishment.  
In light of the complexities of focus and approach, this article aims to 
highlight the most relevant problems that arise from the current attempts to 
exempt people who suffer from mental illness from the death penalty and is 
an effort to stimulate discussions to the end of enhancing effective 
protection.  Part I will address two background issues: whether new 
standards are needed, and whether law and psychiatry are compatible 
enough to allow for an interdisciplinary approach.  Part II of the article will 
briefly highlight the main aspects of the ABA’s and AI’s proposals.  Part III 
will analyze the shortcomings of the existing proposals, focusing on the use 
of a categorical and a time-framed approach.  Finally, Part IV proposes 
alternate paths to more effectively protect people who suffer from mental 
illness—focusing on due process and fair resolution as well as improving 
access to medical care. 
I. BACKGROUND ISSUES IN ASSESSING THE PROPOSALS   
Two background issues need to be addressed before examining the 
positive and negative aspects of the ABA and AI proposals.  First, given 
that there are already safeguards built into criminal legal systems—
particularly in the United States—such as rules regarding competence and 
the plea of insanity, this section will explore whether a need exists for a new 
set of protective rules.16  Second, this section will examine whether an 
interdisciplinary approach is feasible. 
A. The Need for New Safeguards 
In criminal law in the United States there are three avenues of protection 
for the “insane.”  First, it is possible to present claims of insanity or lack of 
competency in several phases of trial.  Second, in the sentencing phase of a 
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capital trial, the defense can introduce evidence of mental disorder as a 
mitigating factor.  Finally, after sentencing, the argument can be made that 
the defendant belongs to one of the categories exempt from the death 
penalty.  After the resumption of the death penalty in the United States in 
the wake of the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. Georgia,17 
exemptions from capital punishment have been granted to the “insane” 
(Ford v. Wainwright),18 to children (Roper v. Simmons),19 and to the 
mentally retarded (Atkins v. Virginia).20   
In practice, however, these guarantees are insufficient.21  Although Ford 
v. Wainwright established an exemption for the “insane,” it did not establish 
a specific definition of competence, of insanity, or of the procedures to 
determine these two concepts.22  Besides, as the AI report makes clear, 
despite these legal protections, several people with obvious mental 
disorders have been sentenced and put to death in the United States23—
calling into question the effectiveness of the existing protection.24  
Specifically, the lack of a constitutionally protected full competency 
hearing on supervening insanity25 and differences in lexical usages between 
the legal and medical fields demonstrate the inadequacies of the current 
system. 
In addition to the problems raised by the lack of a constitutionally 
protected competency hearing, the difficulty posed by interdisciplinary 
communication also hampers the effort to protect people who suffer from 
mental illness from the death penalty.  As a result of lexical usage, 
communication about mental health between law and medicine is difficult.  
While the concepts of insanity and competence are legal rather than 
medical, the concept of suffering from mental illness is medical.  As a 
result, conflicting approaches to assessing mental illness arise between the 
medical and legal experts.  
For instance, it is common in the classification of mental disorders to use 
adjectives such as mild or severe to determine the level of the existing 
disease.  From a psychiatric perspective, the inclusion of such adjectives 
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comes after the determination that the disease exists; the adjective serves to 
qualify it.  On the other hand, for a person outside the medical profession, 
the inclusion of the words mild or severe may be the decisive factor in the 
perception of the existence of the disease itself and not merely a qualifying 
factor.  Such modifiers have also led to the perception that mild diminished 
capacity may still be enough capacity to be executed.   
Currently, the threshold for mental disease used in legal procedures 
seems to be higher than those used in medicine; only severe mental 
disorders are perceived as diseases from a legal perspective, whereas from a 
medical standpoint, even mild disorders are diseases.  Given that this 
assessment will lead to the establishment of whether or not the person is 
“insane” and/or competent, this difference is extremely relevant.  Yet, as a 
result of the difference in lexical usage, sometimes very little weight is 
given to the psychiatrist’s expert opinion about the condition of the 
defendant in relation to his or her mental status because the court’s focus is 
on legal thresholds rather than on the medical condition.   
Another example of communication difficulties related to lexical usage is 
the fact that juries not only tend to misunderstand the meaning of the word 
mitigating, but also tend to attribute to it the opposite meaning, 
understanding the word to mean aggravating and believing the existence of 
mental illness contributes to a “greater likelihood of being dangerous in the 
future.”26 
Given the above, even if current legal safeguards covered all grounds of 
legal and psychiatric concepts of insanity, they would still fail to adequately 
protect people who suffer from mental illnesses and/or diseases from the 
death penalty. 
B. A Closer Dialogue Between Law and Psychiatry 
The second background issue is whether an effective collaboration 
between law and psychiatry, the foundation of an interdisciplinary approach 
to the issue of the death penalty and mental illness, is possible.  There are 
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two likely barriers to such collaboration.  First, as a general principle, the 
legal field is hesitant to rely on other fields of knowledge.  Second, there is 
the question as to whether law and psychiatry are compatible.  
Although legal arguments carry the most weight in legal analysis, law is 
incomplete by itself.  Thus, there needs to be space for arguments based on 
other types of knowledge such as economics, social science, and political 
science, as well as expertise in technical areas such as the use of DNA in 
paternity tests and the assessment of environmental damages.  While 
specialized testimony and opinions may be allowed, the legal system 
remains unreceptive to some sciences.27  This lack of receptiveness28 often 
results in expert testimony of nonlegal experts being disregarded.  This is 
true in the case of psychiatrists’ opinions in relation to people who suffer 
from mental illness.  
Even though it seems logical that medical professionals are in a better 
position to ascertain the mental health of a defendant, the law allows the 
legal actors (such as judges and jurors) a vast level of discretion by not 
requiring that they follow the experts’ conclusions.  Courts, thus, tend to use 
expert data as they see fit, misapplying or misusing data when they believe 
the data will enhance the persuasiveness of their opinions, ignoring or 
rejecting data despite its dependence on empirically testable statements in 
support of its holdings, and disparaging data when the research does not 
support their views.29  An example of this practice is the rejection by the 
Supreme Court of social psychology studies and empirical research in 
Lockhart v. McCree in 1986.30 
Thus, courts sometimes accept the influence of other fields so long as this 
influence is filtered by the law itself.  This feature is important for the 
analysis of the issue at stake here insofar as no matter how logical or 
convincing a psychiatric argument is, one will always need to find legal 
arguments to support it. 
As to whether law and psychiatry are compatible, it has been argued that 
because law and medicine have opposing methods and aims, collaboration 
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will be difficult.  For example, while law uses an adversarial methodology, 
medicine uses a cooperative one31—a difference that could lead to very 
different outcomes.  As to goals:  
[s]ometimes the aims of medicine and law may be perceived as 
conflicting.  This may occur insofar as law may be viewed as 
concentrating on rights whereas medicine may be seen as 
concentrating on needs.  Similarly, law functions primarily to 
recompense or avoid harm while the primary aim of medicine is 
directed towards conferring benefits.32 
While these incompatibilities may exist within a classic and formalist 
concept of law, if one adds to the relationship an international human rights 
legal perspective, those incompatibilities become surmountable.  The aim of 
international human rights law is to protect the individual and assure his or 
her fundamental rights while focusing on needs, avoiding harm, and 
conferring benefits.  International human rights law, therefore, combines the 
aims of medicine (conferring benefits) and of traditional concepts of law 
(recompensing or avoiding harm).  In addition, international human rights 
law employs a more cooperative rather than adversarial methodology, for 
the main value to be protected is human dignity.33  This approach implies 
that the most protective standards possible should be chosen and that an 
interest (even an obligation) by states to find the ideal solution to each case 
should exist.  From this perspective, the burden of assessing the existence of 
mental illness would be shared between the state and the individual, as it 
would be in the interest of both to ensure that the right conclusion is 
reached.34  
Thus, in addressing the protection of people who suffer from mental 
illness from the death penalty, when the perspective and principles of 
international human rights law are brought to bear, law and psychiatry are 
not only compatible but are also complementary.35  For instance, the 
American Psychiatric Association guidelines address both human rights 
issues such as interrogation of detainees36 and the death penalty,37 but they 
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also assert that human rights and human dignity are to be observed in the 
conduct of psychiatrists.38  
One can say that law and psychiatry can work together and also that, in 
the issue of the death penalty and mental illness, they must do so if the 
peculiarities involved are to be taken into consideration in an attempt to 
provide the most protective system possible. 
II. THE ABA’S AND AI’S PROPOSALS 
In the wake of Atkins v. Virginia,39 which established an exemption to the 
death penalty for the mentally retarded, the ABA and AI began, as 
previously mentioned, to advocate a similar exemption for people who 
suffer from mental illness.  Given that the “insane” exemption did not 
protect people who suffer from mental disorders from the death penalty, the 
proposal focuses on the concept of diminished culpability to exempt people 
with mental retardation from the death penalty and, to a lesser extent, on the 
lack of humanity in killing sick people40 to advance a similar exemption to 
people who suffer from mental illness.  
The idea of using limitations as a way to progressively achieve the goal 
of abolition is, in fact, a common trend around the world.  This goal is 
carried out either through the existence of moratoria in the application of 
death sentences, or through a variety of exemptions including limitations on 
both what crimes41 and which people42 are subject to the death penalty and 
what methods of imposition are acceptable.43  The movement in the United 
States to exempt people who suffer from mental illness from the death 
penalty is a clear example of the desire to establish a categorical limitation 
for a particular group of people.  
AI published a report on January 31, 2006, on the issue of mental illness 
and the death penalty.44  Consistent with the organization’s general practice, 
the report relies on the persuasive power of practical examples; it narrates 
several cases of people in the United States who suffer from mental illness 
and who either were executed or are on the death row as a way to 
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demonstrate that the system is failing and that action needs to be taken to 
remedy the situation.   
According to the report, its aims are twofold.  On the one hand, it shows 
that people who suffer from mental illness continue to be executed, and 
thus, that the existing safeguards are not enough.45  On the other hand, it 
demonstrates that there is no reason why mental illness and mental 
retardation should be treated differently in relation to an exemption from the 
death penalty.46  The report also states that establishing which individuals 
should be exempt from capital punishment due to the existence of a mental 
illness at the time of the crime is not one of its goals.47  
The shortcomings of the report exist both in relation to the internal 
consistency of the report and to the adequacy of the report in addressing 
mental illness and the death penalty.  In relation to the internal consistency, 
there are two problems.  First, although the report acknowledges the 
difference between mental retardation and mental illness, it tries to 
analogize these two mental disorders.  This is inconsistent and has the 
potential to backfire once the important differences in these concepts arise. 
Mental disorder is the broad term encompassing all mental diseases.48  
Within the general concept of mental disorders, there are two axes of 
diseases.49  The first encompasses the so-called process disorders and the 
second the so-called development disorders.  Process disorders, generally 
called mental illnesses, exist when the illness is a result of an event that 
changes the behavior of the individual.  Mental illness causes episodes of 
the disease rather than a continuous state of being mentally ill; accordingly, 
there could be periods where the disease exists but is dormant.  On the other 
hand, a development disorder exists when the illness is inherent to the 
person and does not appear in episodes but rather can be permanently 
verified.  This is the case of people suffering from mental retardation,50 for 
instance.51 
 In light of these differences, the use of the same approach for two 
different situations is problematic, especially given that the perception and 
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diagnosis of mental retardation is much more constant than one of mental 
illness, as will be seen in Part III of this article. 
Second, although the AI report says that it does not occupy itself with 
people who suffer from mental illness at the time of the crime, several 
examples in the report include people in this category; thus it uses examples 
that do not support its thesis or recommendations.  Moreover, if the idea is 
to carve out an exemption from the death penalty for people who suffer 
from mental illness, determining who is encompassed by such an 
exemption, notwithstanding its difficulty, is an issue that cannot be avoided.  
In relation to the adequacy of the mental illness topic, there are several 
issues—such as the use of a categorical approach and a time-framed 
evaluation of mental illness—that, as will be seen later in this article, are 
not as developed as they should be, which may lead to suboptimal solutions.  
The problem of adequacy seems related to the lack of a deep 
interdisciplinary approach to the topic.  Adding to this is the problem of 
giving more weight to advancing the abolition of the death penalty than to 
trying to ensure the most protective system possible for people who suffer 
from mental illness within the existing retentionist framework. 
The deficiency of this approach is exemplified in the main solution 
proposed by the AI report.  AI calls for both the respect of the United 
Nations Principles for the Protection of People with Mental Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care52 and other measures.53  Its main focus, 
however, is on the need for a norm—either through a Supreme Court 
decision or legislation—that categorically exempts people who suffer from 
mental illness from the death penalty.  As will be seen in the following 
sections, this solution is inadequate given that people with mental illness are 
still being executed despite the exception for the “insane.” 
The ABA created the Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death 
Penalty within its Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, which 
proposed three recommendations regarding people with mental retardation 
or dementia and mental disorder or disability.54  Although also focusing on 
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a categorical exemption, the ABA proposal is more detailed than the one 
presented by AI because it includes criteria to limit the application of the 
exemption in practice.55  The ABA proposal also has the advantage56 of 
having been accepted by the American Psychiatric Association;57 in 
addition, the American Psychological Association is currently analyzing the 
proposal and will likely endorse it.58  These acceptances add legitimacy to 
the debate; on the other hand, they may lead to the false conclusion that the 
ABA proposes an interdisciplinary approach that is sufficient to adequately 
deal with the issue of the death penalty and mental illness.   
Another issue is the significantly different language adopted by the ABA 
and the American Psychiatric Association.  The American Psychiatric 
Association’s proposal does not use a time-framed concept, as it does not 
mention the existence of a mental illness at the time of the offense; it does 
not mention a severe mental illness, but only mental illness; it uses the 
broader idea of a fair resolution of the case, rather than focusing on more 
limited legal concepts; and it clarifies that for a person to be mentally 
competent, he or she has to both be aware of and appreciate the nature of 
the punishment.  Such differences make the conclusion that the ABA 
proposal brings a sufficient interdisciplinary approach unfounded. 
Both the ABA and AI should be commended for trying to limit the use of 
capital punishment and for bringing to the public’s attention the lack of 
effective protection of people who suffer from mental illness from the death 
penalty.  Nevertheless, the current proposals are insufficient to ensure 
effective protection. 
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROPOSALS 
Both the AI and ABA proposals demonstrate that the current system is 
not always effective in protecting people who suffer from mental illness 
from the death penalty; therefore, new standards are justified.  Because 
these proposals do not take an interdisciplinary approach, their 
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recommended solutions will not sufficiently enhance protections to ensure 
that people with mental illness are not executed.    
This part will examine the shortcomings of the two proposals.  It will 
begin with an evaluation of the core idea of the proposals: the use of the 
categorical approach in advocating an exemption from the death penalty for 
people who suffer from mental illness.  Next, it will examine the time-
framed approach, which provides protection for people who suffer from 
mental illness at the time of the crime, at the time of the trial, and at the 
time of execution.  
A. The Use of a Categorical Approach 
The core idea of the proposals is to advance a categorical approach to 
exempt people who suffer from mental illness.  This categorical approach 
builds on international law and practice as abolition of the death penalty is 
increasingly59 advocated in international law,60 and the right to life61 is 
already a part of the core of international human rights law.  Although these 
efforts could lead to outlawing capital punishment, it is not currently 
prohibited.62 
The different international law approaches to the death penalty are 
reflected by two sets of international law documents.  Some international 
documents such as the Second Additional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) advocate total abolition of 
capital punishment; states that ratify the Second Additional Protocol to the 
ICCPR63 commit to abolishing the death penalty.64  
However, other international documents, while supporting the 
aspirational character of this goal—total abolition of capital punishment65— 
only go so far as to impose categorical limitations on the death penalty.  
This approach is reflected by both Article 6 of the ICCPR and the United 
Nations Safeguards that guarantee protection of the rights of those facing 
the death penalty.66  Article 6 of the ICCPR, for example, states that the 
death penalty cannot be imposed on people under eighteen years of age or 
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pregnant women; it can only be imposed for the most serious crimes, after a 
final judgment by a competent court, and without retroactive application of 
law.67  Article 6 thus utilizes categories or closed classes of people that are 
exempted from capital punishment. 
Additionally, in 1984, nine UN Safeguards were adopted by the 
Economic and Social Council68 and embraced by the General Assembly.69  
Among other goals, the UN Safeguards aim to “exempt those under 18 
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, pregnant women, 
new mothers and those who are or have become ‘insane.’”70 
Protection of the “insane” is ensured by the 1989 revision of Safeguard 3, 
which also led to the inclusion of the aged as a category of people exempted 
from capital punishment.71  Although the original text only exempted from 
the death penalty people who had become “insane,” the revision expanded 
this exemption to include people “suffering from mental retardation or 
extremely limited mental competence, whether at the sentencing stage or at 
execution.”72  
Even though the UN safeguards are not legally binding, they are relevant 
because they set a trend towards categorical exemptions for children, 
pregnant women, new mothers, and the “insane.”  Exemptions such as these 
have been adopted in isolation or in groups by some countries and have 
inspired national movement, which advocate gradual limitations of the 
death penalty by focusing on increasing categorical exemptions.  The AI 
and ABA proposals adopt this approach.73  Although the categorical 
approach may be effective in limiting the death penalty for certain groups, 
in relation to people who suffer from mental illness, the feasibility of such a 
path is questionable for several reasons, which are explored below. 
1. Mental Illness as the Identification Factor of a Distinguishable 
Group 
The first challenge in using a categorical approach in creating a mental 
illness exception to the death penalty is that defining mental illness as the 
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aggregate factor of an identifiable group may be a complex (and possibly 
insurmountable) task. 
All the other categories in which exemptions to the death penalty have 
been carved out—namely pregnant women, new mothers, children, aged 
people, and the mentally retarded—are categories whose definitions and 
determination are easier because, to some extent, they form closed classes.  
It is not difficult to determine whether a woman is pregnant or has recently 
had a baby, or whether a person is under the age of eighteen or over a 
certain age.  Although there are some controversies about assessing whether 
a person suffers from mental retardation, the general concept of mental 
retardation is not problematic.74  
However, when it comes to mental illness, defining a closed class 
presents many challenges.  First, mental illness involves the complexity of 
the human mind, which is far from totally understood, and scientific 
definitions are not fixed and exact but rather evolving and mutable.75  
Second, diagnoses and prognoses of mental disorders vary historically76 
based on changing social perceptions77 and on new medical discoveries; 
what is perceived as a mental disorder today may not be in a few years and 
vice versa.78  Third, because the diagnoses of mental disorders are not made 
in a vacuum but by a human prone to cultural bias, the diagnoses may be 
biased as well.79  This means that what may be perceived as a mental 
disorder in one culture may be perceived as a common social practice or 
reaction in another.80  In this sense, diagnoses of mental disorders are 
historically and culturally constructed81 concepts.82  Therefore, they are not 
easily standardized to enable a categorical definition of people who suffer 
from mental illness.   
Exemplyifing the difficulty in establishing a categorical definition are the 
two equally credible classification tools currently being applied in relation 
to mental disorders:83 the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) 
created by the World Health Organization84 and the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) published by the 
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American Psychiatric Association.85  This duplicity shows that there is no 
universal standard for classification of mental disorders; even among the 
expert community, there is no consensus on standards for classification.  
Such duplicity presents a serious challenge in creating a categorical 
exemption based on a closed class of mental illness. 
2. The Broad Range of Diseases that Are Mental Illnesses   
Furthermore, the mental illnesses that are grouped together in both the 
ICD and the DSM-IV are diverse diseases ranging from schizophrenia and 
personality disorders to anorexia and sleep disorders.86  This vast variety of 
diseases may be a factor in creating opposition to the adoption of a 
categorical exemption due to the sheer numbers of individuals with these 
conditions. 
Given that psychiatry is an evolving and flexible science, and that 
diagnosis of mental illness is culturally and socially constructed, it is not 
surprising that there are competing statistics on the prevalence of mental 
illness.  The more conservative studies find that up to 10 percent of inmates 
on death row suffer from serious mental illness.87  However, other studies 
suggest that the proportion of prisoners on death row who have been treated 
for some kind of psychiatric disorder can be as high as one-third.88  This 
wide range of percentages reflects the ranges of the total general population; 
comprehensive studies suggest that “32% of the population have or have 
had a psychiatric disorder (lifetime prevalence), . . . that 20% had an active 
disorder (meaning that they had met criteria for a disorder at some time in 
the person’s life and had at least one symptom in the year prior to the 
interview),”89 and that “48% of the population ha[d] at least one psychiatric 
disorder at some time in their life and 29% in the past year.”90  
In view of these high percentages, having a categorical approach might 
be problematic for two additional reasons.  First, from the point of view of 
criminal law, because a large percentage of the inmates on death row would 
be exempted by the adoption of this standard, it would create a de facto 
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abolition of the death penalty, which is not currently feasible within the 
United States’ retentionist framework.  This is especially true if one takes 
into consideration that mental illness diagnoses91 and death sentences 92 are 
higher among African Americans, who currently represent 42 percent of the 
population on death row.93  Thus, in light of the fact that the United States is 
retentionist, the advocacy of such an abolitionist policy does not seem 
feasible. 
Second, even from a human rights approach, if the death penalty is 
abolished and not replaced by a more humane form of punishment, the 
result could be widespread impunity.  This is due to the fact that the human 
rights system also has to consider victims’ rights,94 which means that it is 
not in favor of criminal acts going unpunished.95  Thus, a situation in which 
huge numbers of crimes will go unpunished is unacceptable under 
international human rights law.  Obviously, other forms of punishment 
could—and from a human rights perspective should—substitute the death 
penalty to prevent both impunity and application of capital punishment. 
3. Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility 
A third problem with adopting a categorical approach is determining 
which relevant assessment criteria should be used to establish criminal 
responsibility and, therefore, which groups would be exempted. 
The ABA and AI proposals focus on the concept of diminished capacity 
due to mental illness; they argue that such diminished capacity 
demonstrates a lack of criminal responsibility and, thus, should be a basis 
for an exemption from the death penalty.96  If one expects a result that is 
both just and feasible, a dialogue between criminal law and psychiatry is 
required in order to determine which individuals are not criminally 
responsible due to dimished capacity.  One solution would be to distinguish 
among diseases that affect the cognitive abilities of the individual, 
jeopardizing his or her capacity to understand what is right or wrong.  This 
qualification of the mental illness category appears in the ABA 
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recommendation97 and may be more feasible in a retentionist country than a 
categorical exemption for people who suffer from mental illness because it 
limits the number of people that would benefit from the exemption. 
However, in the same way that diagnoses of mental illnesses are fluid, 
determinations of whether a mental illness impairs the ability to tell right 
from wrong also may be fluid.  Thus, the acceptance of a categorical 
exemption, even with a qualification that limits the number of people to 
which it applies, may still be too broad a norm and may not mark an 
evolution from the current “insane” exemption. 
The arbitrariness of drawing distinctions is exemplified by the ABA 
recommendations, which suggest that “[a] disorder manifested primarily by 
repeated criminal conduct or attributable solely to the acute effects of 
voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not, standing alone, constitute a 
mental disorder.”98  This assertion is problematic because, on the one hand, 
there are studies that show that most people (some say 70 percent)99 who 
suffer from mental illness and who are in the criminal system are not 
violent,100 but rather were arrested for behavior linked to the illness.101  In 
addition, other studies demonstrate that repeated criminal conduct can be 
symptomatic of a disease; for example, there are four times as many people 
who suffer from mental illness in prison than in hospitals on any given 
day.102  On the other hand, it has been established that the use of alcohol 
and drugs can lead to schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders.  From a 
medical point of view, these disorders, once established, are as much a 
disease as any other mental disorder—regardless of their original causes.103 
Besides the above-mentioned problems with determining the relevant 
assessment criteria to establish criminal responsibility (due to the 
particularities of mental illness), there is also a general divergence between 
criminal law and psychiatry about the basis of competence.  Criminal law 
attempts to draw the line by focusing on criminal competency, a notion that 
is based on the belief of free will and conscience; given the retributive 
character of punishment, when an individual commits a crime and is 
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conscious of his or her act, that person can and should be punished.104  
However, it has been argued by psychiatrists that this notion is inadequate 
since “free will is a legal fiction.”105  “[B]ehavior is not so unfettered.  It is 
determined as a result of the confluence of genetic endowment and life 
experiences.  In that view, . . . there are no heroes and there are no 
villains.”106  In adopting an interdisciplinary approach, as proposed by this 
article, the divergence between the two systems could paralyze the criminal 
system, as each approach to determining competency bases itself on a 
different ideology.  As this is not the desired outcome, one has to focus on 
more nuanced, practical solutions while trying to encourage a dialogue 
between criminal law and psychiatry to find common ground. 
B.  Time-framed Evaluations of Mental Illness 
Another problematic aspect of both the existing and proposed standards 
of protection is that they focus on the existence of a mental illness at the 
time of the commission of the crime, sentencing, or execution.  Although 
these time-framed evaluations seem to protect people who suffer from 
mental illness from capital punishment, in reality, they do not. 
The main flaw with using a time-framed evaluation arises when a person 
suffers from mental illness but the disease is not present at the time of the 
commission of the crime, at sentencing, or at execution.  Generally, if a 
person commits a crime while mentally ill, the legal concept of insanity or 
incompetence and the “insane” exemption will be sufficient to protect 
against a death sentence because his or her mental capacity will be deemed 
diminished.  The same is true if a person becomes mentally ill either after 
being sentenced or at the time of execution.  Such a development is 
possibile according to the etiology of mental disorders; mental disorders can 
be a result of genetically inherited trends or can result from external factors 
such as brain damage or traumatic experiences such as the tension of living 
on death row.107  On the other hand, if a person is not mentally ill at the 
specific times established by the law, he or she will receive no protection 
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whatsoever from capital punishment.  This situation is possible because 
mental illness is considered a process disorder rather than a development 
disorder, which means the illness may not be in place at a specific time but 
may exist and impair the person’s cognitive skills nonetheless.  
Given that mental illness is a process disorder, trying to capture the 
existence of the disease in specific time frames may lead to the conclusion 
that the disease does not exist when, in fact, the person is simply not having 
an episode at that time.  If the court accepts that reasoning, then it will 
assume that the person has the competence to understand the reasons and 
consequences of his or her act and, therefore, could deem the defendant 
legally competent and subject to capital punishment. 
Another troubling factor is that some mental illnesses have sequelas, 
which means that although the person is not having an episode at a given 
time, his or her competence and conscience level is still diminished.108  This 
could be a case of approximation of a process disorder and a development 
disorder in which the person has a permanent lower level of reasoning even 
though the disease does not seem to be present.  Sequelas are significant in 
light of the notion of free will and conscience as the basis of criminal 
responsibility.  
Currently, the criterion used in the United States to determine whether a 
person is “insane” is one of awareness.  According to the threshold 
established in Ford v. Wainwright, as long as the person is aware of what is 
going to happen to him or her (i.e., execution) and why (i.e., because of the 
commission of a crime), the person is considered sufficiently competent to 
be executed.109 
The practical problem that arises from the current “insanity” definition is 
the notion that a person who suffers from a mental illness can be forcibly 
treated and restored to competence, which would ultimately lead to his or 
her execution.  This presents the alarming prospect of “healing” a mentally 
ill person solely to execute him or her.  Another aspect of this situation is 
the possibility that this restored conscience is likely only due to the 
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administration of medicines and is not a real cure.  Were the medicines to 
be withdrawn, the person would once again be considered “insane” and 
therefore not subject to execution. 
Although a situation where one might be “cured” solely to be executed is 
legally permitted, if approached from a medical perspective, the same 
situation would not be permissible.  Medical treatment considers the best 
interest of the patient; the restoration to competency in order to execute 
would contravene medical goals—it would not be in the best interest of 
anyone to be treated in order to be executed.  An interdisciplinary approach 
to mental illness and capital punishment would avoid this appalling 
situation because the existence of the disease at any time would result in 
exemption from capital punishment. 
Therefore, the time-framed evaluation of mental illness has a fatal flaw.  
This flaw arises when a person suffers from a mental illness but the disease 
is not in place at the time of the commission of the crime, sentencing, or 
execution.  If this approach is retained, many people who suffer from 
mental illness will be executed. 
IV. ALTERNATE PATHS 
Based on the foregoing, focusing on preexistent abolitionist tactics will 
not increase protection from the death penalty for people who suffer from 
mental illness.  Thus, a change of focus is necessary.  The focus should be 
on protecting people who suffer from mental illness rather than on 
abolishing the death penalty.  This focus better provides intervention 
alternatives that ensure effective protection from capital punishment.  The 
following sections of this article explore two of these interventions: (1) due 
process and fair resolution, and (2) improving access to medical care. 
A. Focusing on Due Process and Fair Resolution 
This section will discuss how traditional due process protections are often 
functionally lacking in cases involving mental illnesses.110  Although both 
       Death Penalty and Mental Illness 373 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007 
the ABA’s and AI’s proposals lack emphasis on the procedural aspects 
involved in a capital case, focusing on enhancing procedural guarantees to 
ensure adequate application of rules would be a step toward a more 
protective framework.  This section will first establish why such a focus 
may be the best way to protect people who suffer from mental illness from 
the death penalty and then will argue that people who suffer from mental 
illness should have additional due process protection.  Finally, this section 
proposes specific improvements to due process protections and fair 
resolution. 
Because there is little likelihood that the death penalty will be abolished 
in the immediate future in the United States, improving the effectiveness of 
due process protections is likely the best way to protect people who suffer 
from mental illness from the death penalty.  The death penalty will unlikely 
be abolished due to the high legal standard and the climate of the current 
Supreme Court—while having stayed some executions, it is not keen on 
improving existing guarantees.111 
Most challenges to the death penalty are based on categorical approaches 
and arise under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual 
punishment.  For a claim to be successful, excessive punishment must be 
established either under the criterion existing at the time the Bill of Rights 
was adopted or against the evolving standard of decency.112  A broad 
exemption for people who suffer from mental illness would not survive 
either of these standards.  Although lunatics—as the “insane” were called at 
the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights—are excluded from the death 
penalty, the criterion used then was a time-framed analysis, which leads to 
the above-mentioned problem of underinclusiveness.113  The evolving 
standard of decency test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court is based in part 
on the number of states that have abolished the death penalty.  So far only 
one state, Connecticut, has statutes that prohibit the execution of people 
who suffer from mental illness at the time of the commission of the 
crime.114  Only one other state, New Jersey, has repealed the death penalty 
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after the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Gregg v. Georgia.115  And only 
one other state, Indiana, seems keen to start debates on a similar 
proposition.116  Thus, because so few states have banned the death penalty, 
a claim that the practice—applied to people who suffer from mental 
illness—offends the U.S. evolving standard of decency would not be 
successful.  
As to the current Supreme Court, there is reason to believe that it is not 
open to expanding the category of insanity.  According to the Associated 
Press, “[u]ntil now, the high court has avoided challenges to insanity 
defense laws”117 and “seem[s] uninterested . . . in broadly addressing the 
constitutional rights of psychotic criminal defendants whose lawyers want 
them sentenced to psychiatric facilities instead of prisons.”118  In a recent 
case, Panetti v. Quaterman, the Supreme Court was unwilling to diminish 
the reach of the death penalty.119  In that case, the Court refused to establish 
new standards for the competency of people to be executed; instead, it 
referred the case back to the federal district court, holding that the existing 
standards had not been met.120  This likely means that present attempts to 
advance a categorical ban for people suffering from mental illness would be 
unsuccessful.   
To ensure effective protection, special standards of due process would 
have to be established specifically for people who suffer from mental 
illness.  Establishing special standards might be opposed based on the belief 
that creating new rights for a specific population would be a violation of 
equality.  This perception, however, is misplaced.  The concept of equality 
encompasses both formal equality (i.e., treating all people equally) and 
substantive equality (taking differences into consideration as necessary for 
actual protection).121  As the above-mentioned problems show, existing 
standards are not enough; thus, these special protections would simply 
afford people who suffer from mental illness the same level of protections 
as others.  This claim could be read as a reversal from the idea of different 
but equal—which has served as a basis for ensuring human rights to 
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disabled people—to a formula of equal but different, whereby people who 
suffer from mental illness are entitled to the same human rights as other 
individuals (with some adaptation of the guarantees to effectuate them) in 
light of their specific needs and particularities.122 
Another problem with current fair trial and due process protections is that 
they suffer from arbitrariness, as shown by the cases included in the AI 
report.123  If there is arbitrariness, the death penalty cannot be imposed; 
Article 6 of the ICCPR states, among other things, that “no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”124  According to the UN Principles on the 
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions,125 if the perception of arbitrariness appears, then the 
state has to try to avoid arbitrary executions by judicial or other means.126 
The approach of having special due process protections in order to 
protect vulnerable people is supported by several Supreme Court decisions 
stating that due process does not have a single formula and can be 
“flexibilized” in different categories.127  Also, as the right to due process is 
protected by the U.S. Constitution,128 if the strengthened procedural 
guarantees were established by a Supreme Court decision, they would 
enhance uniformity of capital punishment decisions and further advance 
limitations on the practice.  This conclusion is supported by a recent 
practice in China, whose high court has assumed a more centralized role by 
reviewing all capital punishment cases, which has resulted in a decrease in 
death penalty verdicts.129  
The idea proposed by this article is to improve existing standards in the 
regular criminal procedure rather than create a new system to deal with 
people who suffer from mental illness.  A new system—a mental health 
court model—is inconsistent with the broader arguments being made here 
because it preconditions jurisdiction of the court on a guilty plea, which is 
contrary to the idea that a person who suffers from mental illness has 
diminished capacity and is therefore not guilty of criminal acts.  Further, 
having a separate system may lead to increased stigma and prejudice, 
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further eroding the human rights of people who suffer from mental 
illness.130 
Thus, having a special set of standards of fair trial and due process to 
accommodate the needs of people who suffer from mental illness would not 
be a violation of the principle of equality.  In addition, the creation of these 
special standards would not only benefit people who suffer from mental 
illness but also quell fears among those who worry that a defendant could 
fake the existence of a mental illness in order to escape the death penalty—a 
common fear among those who defend the death penalty in general.131  
Given that people who suffer from mental illness are currently subject to 
the death penalty and likely will be for the foreseeable future, improving 
due process protections and fair resolution is critical.  Some procedural 
protections for people who suffer from mental illness exist, but they could 
be improved at the following three stages: trial, sentencing, and execution. 
Past and continuing executions of people with clear mental disorders132 
demonstrate that the existence of a general exemption is not a guarantee 
against inadequate application of that exemption.  Problems have occurred 
when applying the rule in cases that have led to the conviction and 
execution of people that clearly met the definition of “insane.”  
Apart from the issue of competency, defendants with mental illness 
contribute to a range of procedural problems related to their illness, such as 
not allowing their attorneys to present facts related to the existence of the 
illness, not cooperating with their attorneys, and not being willing to 
participate in an appeal.  In addition, defendants with mental illness are 
sometimes willing to be executed,133 which jeopardizes the application of 
safeguards because arguments for diminished capacity and for 
incompetence then cannot be made.  One possible solution that would 
address many of these concerns is to allow another person to act in the best 
interests of the defendant.  This solution is stated in the ABA 
recommendation134 and seems to improve the treatment of people who 
suffer from mental illness.  Some advocates of mental health rights, 
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however, criticize this proposal and, instead, maintain that the goal in 
dealing with mental disorders is autonomy for those who suffer from mental 
disorders.135 
Juries pose additional problems—specifically, the existence of 
prejudice136 and lack of understanding of the real impact of mental illnesses 
on behavior.137  First, as much as 75 percent of the public view people with 
mental illness as violent.138  Given that the perception of danger plays a role 
in “convincing” jurors of defendants’ guilt in criminal proceedings, this 
perception, coupled with fear and misunderstanding, can lead to guilty 
verdicts.  Second, jury decisions are often impacted by jury members’ 
perceptions as to whether and to what degree the defendants feel remorse.139  
This is problematic for defendants that suffer from mental illness, as they 
may be unable to show remorse as a result of their disease because they 
may lack the cognitive skills to understand their actions and to separate 
right from wrong.140 
Additionally, jurors often mistakenly believe that the alternative to a 
death sentence is liberty rather than life imprisonment or commitment to a 
psychiatric institution.  There is still pervasive stigma and fear of people 
who suffer from mental illness due to lack of knowledge about various 
disorders; this stigma and fear may influence jurors to believe that the 
behavior of the defendant will lead to future violent behavior.141  Ensuring 
that society will not be at risk if the death penalty is not applied—for the 
defendant will not be set free, but rather sent to a treatment facility—can 
substantially change the mood of the jurors to reject the death penalty and 
sentence a person to life. 
Moreover, both due process and fair trial are long-established civil and 
political rights dating back to the ratification of the Fifth Amendment.  If 
more concern for the proper application of due process protections and fair 
trial were present, more people who suffer from mental illness would be 
protected from the death penalty.  This is the idea expressed, for instance, in 
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the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, which also focuses on the right to a fair trial.142 
In light of the above, adding attention to the procedural aspects of 
criminal cases should be a part of the effort to limit the imposition of the 
death penalty to people who suffer from mental illness.  Adequate 
procedural protections would, at a minimum, involve a panel of doctors to 
evaluate the disease (to avoid personal bias and prejudice and guarantee an 
opinion less fallible than the one obtained by relying on just one expert).  
The evaluation should: (1) involve meeting not only the defendant but also 
people connected to him or her (to gather more information and also 
because the mere existence of the disease sometimes prevents the defendant 
from being able or willing to assist in his or her own evaluation); (2) be a 
product of more than one interview with the defendant (so to be true to the 
process-like features of diagnosis and of the disease); (3) not be the result of 
just a standard test but rather a combination of personal interviews, 
interviews with relatives or members of the personal circle, and tests 
(because experts seem to diverge on which of these strategies is the best 
one); and  (4) should not be focused only on pretrial, in-trial, and 
preexecution procedures (to avoid the above-mentioned underinclusiveness 
of time-framed diagnosis), and a follow-up evaluation.  The panel should be 
composed of: (1) both men and women with diverse ethnic backgrounds 
(because diagnoses are culturally influenced, it is important to have a more 
comprehensive panel in order to minimize the possibility of prejudices 
interfering with the result), and (2) either disinterested doctors or doctors 
chosen by both the defendant and the state (to avoid biased opinions 
depending on who hired the doctor and also due to the burden-sharing 
notion mentioned above).  Adequate procedural protections should also 
include a mandatory psychiatric evaluation in all capital cases (due to the 
fact that the disease may be of such a type that the defendant or his or her 
defense counsel do not recognize the fact that he or she is sick, or because 
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lack of money is often an obstacle in assessing the mental health of a 
defendant). 
B. Improving Access to Medical Care 
A second avenue for improving protection of people who suffer from 
mental illness is improvement of access to medical care.  Some studies 
show that most people who suffer from a mental disorder143 in general, and 
those who suffer from a mental illness and committed a crime in particular, 
lacked adequate medical care in the past.144  Other studies have found 
evidence of the even more perverse situation where people who suffer from 
mental illness commit crimes as a cry for help but do not receive medical 
care.145  In addition, many incarcerated people who suffer from mental 
illness do not receive adequate medical treatment.146  
It is harmful for society as a whole to criminalize being sick,147 especially 
given the effectiveness of current treatment.  According to the American 
Psychiatric Association, the success rate for treatment of mental illnesses is 
high: for major depression, 65 percent; for schizophrenia, 60 percent; for 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, 60 percent; for bipolar disorder, 80 percent; 
and for panic disorder, 80 percent.148  With rates this high, focusing on 
treatment may be an effective strategy for achieving in practice an 
exemption from the death penalty for people who suffer from mental 
illness, especially given that the right to enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health has already been recognized in 
international law.149 
Focusing on access to medical care to protect people who suffer from, 
mental illness from the death penalty will require advocating for economic 
and social rights and will present new challenges.  One of the problems that 
may arise is the cost of providing adequate medical care; however, it is 
extremely expensive to keep people in prison and to execute them, so the 
question seems to be more a choice of how to use resources.  In any event, 
if the goal is to protect people who suffer from mental illness from capital 
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punishment, adequate medical care would curtail the death penalty and 
dedicate resources to treating the illness. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Three changes would ensure better protection from the death penalty for 
people who suffer from mental illness.  First, because mental illness is a 
medical condition, an interdisciplinary approach would ensure that the 
needs of people who suffer from these diseases are effectively addressed.  
Second, procedural guarantees should be enhanced in order to better address 
the needs of people who suffer from mental illness in capital punishment 
cases.  Finally, improving access to medical care would provide people who 
suffer from mental illness needed treatment and help prevent 
criminalization due to mental illness. 
This article demonstrates that no single solution will be able to strike the 
required balance in protecting people who suffer from mental illness within 
systems that maintain the death penalty.  However, with creative and 
interdisciplinary initiatives, it is possible to reconcile the goals of human 
rights, criminal law, and psychiatry to achieve a system that protects people 
who suffer from mental illness from the death penalty. 
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